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816 DARE V. BD. OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS [21 C.2d ' 
, review' of a; decision of an adminIstrative board 'autho#z~d 
to adjudicate issues of fact arising in the application ,of a 
valid statute. Had Dare questioned the validity of thestatu~e 
and the board had ruled against him, he could ~hav,e had the 
decision set aside by certiorari if the reviewing c~urt, cop,~' 
eluded that the statute was invalid. Whateyer were the early, 
'liniitations '1:0 England on the issues open on certiorari, the, 
courts of thiR corintry long ago, held that on certiorari the re-
viewing court can set aside an administrative dC(iision based 
upon anel'rorof law. (A leading case to this effect is Peop!e 
V4 Smith, 45 N.Y., 772, de~ided in 1871; see GQodnow,op C$t., , 
6 Pol. S~i. Quart" 493.) That rule was embodied in section 
462 of the Practice Act of 1851 and in section 1074 of the 
Code of 'CivilProcedure of 1872 byth{provision thntthe re-
vieWing court may ,j determine, Vy hether ' the, inferior triht;lllal, 
Board"()r, 6£ficer has ,regularly pursued,the authority of, such 
tribunal, Board oroffiMr." Itsh9u1d also be observed that 
if a board follows an unconstitutional Procedure, Qrfails to 
follow a prpcedure prescribed by' statute, its decision may be 
set aside on certiol'ari. . , 
Tharecent decisions, requiring trial 4e D,OVO ofthe,:flndings 
of administrative agencies exercising sta1ie~widep~:nyer' have 
assumed that for various reasons it isunconstitutionaI in ,this 
state to vesi"judicialfunctio~" in such agencies, ,'ailthis to· 
a single result, the prevention of review of th~ir decision~ by 
writ of certiorari. Do the functions of these agencies, cease 'to 
be "judicial" when their" decislorisarel'Elviewable by the. ma-
jority's newiy qualified trial de novo?, Has not the maj9;rity 
opinion by its very qualifica~ions of t~ial de, nbvo, d,escrlbed, 
in the first part of this opinion, belied its own contention that 
it' is unconstitutional to authorize such boards to make first 
instance decisions on questions of law ,and issues of fact Y 
I' concur in the judgment insofar as it holds that ~t was 
proper for the trial court to deny the alt~rnative w;rit of 
mandamus. I dissent, on the ground that Standard. 0$'7, Co. y, 
State Board of Equalization,S1tpra, should be overruled and 
that the present decision should be Without prejudice to the 
right of the petitioner to apply for certiorari. 
Gibson, C. J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
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[So F. No. 16829., In Bank. , ~pr. 7, '19~d:\,; fi' 
NORMAN RUSSELL, Respondent, v. ALLEN MlLL,ER; ~~: 
Registrar' of Contractors, etc., et, aI., Kppellmtts. -. ,,' 
> ," 
[1] Administrative taW,.,.;.Mand.lun:u~'l'l1a1De NC)Y~:BVi~on~ 
Record, of Evidence"';';In a m:IiJid!t~li$,-'):id~.edpjf,t({ ~ie~' 
, the' s;ction' ,of thedonti'li~tor;s::~tate:;Li~e,~s,~',~~4i,dt_Jj{'8iror' 
to strikilthe record of th~, oral eyideri¢~ befcitlf the .board: 
which had, been int-roduc~d il.l eVid¢:ilce., " '", 
[2] td.-Mandalnugo,..,.Appeal"",":HarlAles8and;e.e~er,8ible Erroi'~ 
"Strilting' Evidence.-::!IIi"a Wqp.dailiU;~' 'Pr~eeditig, ~Q/';Mli" the; 
evidence of i:J.n tidministrattveJ)oi:J.rd; erro(in 'stI.;J~ibg'tbe :tee.:-: 
ordof' oral evidence , before Jhe ,bQardwas hl1~leB~ )vhero: 
evidence 'intioduced' 'as in,', an- u~liInitea trial ;£e 'nQvo' sUP:". 
ported '~he" findings im4.j'~q~~J;lt,a~d ihis, 'd~spit~,thet~~~~ 
that the petitionerls teatrmpny before the board ",as mQro 
detailed, than in the' trial court. ' . ' , ' 
APPEAL ,from a judgment of the, SuperiOr Court otthe' 
bity: gnd doun,ty of San Fl'anclsco.F~ank T: Deasy, Jlldg~.: 
Affir:Io:ed. . 
P1:o~~edingmIllandamus 'to require' the' nonenforcement of ," 
the. re'Vocati!:lnofa contractor's license' 'and the disfui.iiS8.l Qf. 
the dis(lipliriarYIlroceeding~ Judgmerit directing restcltation' 
,of license' affirmed. 
Earl Warren, Attorney General, Lucas E. Kilkenny,' J. AI-, 
bert Hutchinson and Allen Martin, Deputies Attorney Gen-
eral, for Appellants. 
Geary, & Geary, C. J. Tauzer, Bradford M. Melvin, Dar-
win' Bryan and Charles J: Wiseman for ,Respondent. 
SHENK, J ....... The petitioner filEld" in, the sllp~:n.~r eou::rt a' 
petition for' a writ of ,mandAte directmg ',the,: respondents, 
ContrMtots' State License J30ard, its members ~d itsr~gfs~, 
trar, to ref:rainfromenfol'~ing t:qere'Vocation' otth~, petition. 
er ~~ license ',ElS, an electric'al '~(jritractOr,,' and' to disbtiss the 
complaintperiding before the board. The respondentS have,' 
t1] See 42 Am;Jur. 662. " , ' 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Administrative Law. 
, ' 
! 
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appealed from a judgment which directed them to restore 
the petitioner's license. 
The petitioner was :charged by the registrar of the board, 
with certain violations of the terms ofa contract for the 
reconstruction and aIieration of the Napa High School Build-
ing; one of which was that the work was to be in strict com-
pliance with the Electrical Safety Orders of the' Industrial 
Accident Commission, ,the National Electrical Code,and any 
and aU ordinances, rules and regulations of the city and 
county in which the work was tobe performed. Eleven vio-
lati.ons of the, National Electric Code and Electrical Safety 
Orders and nineteen alleged material and wilful deviations 
from the plans and specifications were specified. The peti-
tioner filed an answer and a hearing was had, whereupon 
it was. found by the board that the evidence showed the vio-
lations as charged. By an· administrative order dated Feb-
rllary 19, 1Q40, the petitioner's license was suspended until, 
February 19, 1941, "and until defendant makes restitution 
to the Board of Trustees of the Napa Union High School 
satisfactory to the Registrar of Contractors," with. a provi-
sion. expressly preserving existing contracts .. A stay ofexe~ 
cution was denied by the board because of the last mentioned 
provision. 
The petition for the writ showing' the foregoing facts was 
filed on March 9, 1940. The petitioner challenged .the juris-
diction ·of the board, pleaded the statute of 'limitations; and 
the insufficiency of. the evidence to sustain the administrative 
findings and conclusion. An alternative writ was issued and 
as a return thereto an . answer to-the petition was filed. The 
tdal 'court found that there had· been certain violations of 
the safety orders, but that with one exception they had oc-
curred more than two years prior to the filing of the com-
plaint, before the board and were therefore barred (sec. 7091 
Bus. & Pro~. Code) ; that in the excepted instance and in the 
cases of other expressly found departures from the plans and 
specifications, the violil.~ions constituted neither wilful de-
partures from nor disregard of the plans or specifications in 
any material respect; that they were not prejudicial and were 
not without the appropriate consent of authorized persons. 
,The trial court conCluded that the petitioner was entitled 
to the restoration of his license and rendered judgment direct-
-ingthe issl.1ance of the peremptory writ; 
. [1] . On the appeal the respondents contend that the trial 
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, court cOnimitte.d prejudicial error in' ruling t9-afa pOl'tioll. of 
the record of the evidence before the board was not a Proper' 
matter for cOI1sideration of the court in the man:d~Diuspro­
ceeding; and in striking that portion of the record frorii,the 
evidence before it. 
At tha commencement of the tri~ the petitioner,st~ted 
that he desired to offer the record oftha proce.ea,mgs,m-
eludIng theol;'al and docum~ntary evidence, taken "before the 
board. The respondents made available a certified, copy, o~ 
the record for that pUI'pose.. It was introduced' in, evi~enrie 
by the 'attorney for the respondents at the ,openillgof the 
second'trial day without any objection o.n the. part of the 
petitiorter~. The trial court. adopted that procedti~eas.being 
inconformity with the decision' of this court' in. Drummeip 
Y • .state Board of Funeral Directors, 13 Cal.2d 75 ,[87 P.2d 
848] . On the third and last day of the' trial, the petition~r 
attetp.pted. to withdraw the record' taken before the board from 
.' the consideration of the court and moved to strike it from 
the evidence on the ground that under the dec4MI:1of the 
Oistrict Court of Appeal shortly theretofore rendered in the 
. case of Laisne v. State Board of. Optometry, • (Cal.App.) 
'r101 P~2d 787] ,he was entitled to a complet'e, anduti~ 
limited trial' de novo. Over the respondents' obje_~tion th,e 
trial court granted the motion as to the transcript of ;()r~l 
evidence, but denied it as to the record of the contracts, ex-
hibits, pleadings and the board's findings and decision. The 
findings and conclusion of the trial court were therefore based 
on the evidence introduced on the mandanlUs h~arm:g btit 
independently Of the record of the oral. evidence beforeth,e 
board... . '
. The ruling of the trial court in so striking the· record of 
the oral evidence was erroneous under the decision, of this . 
cou.rt in the case of Dare· v. Board of Medical Examiners 
(ante1 P. 790 [136 P.2d 304]), this day filed. 'iIi that 
case it waS decided' that the petitioner. in the mandamus pro~ 
ceeding was not entitled to an unlimited tr~al den~v:o; that 
a consideration of the record of . the pl'Qceedingsbefore '.the 
board was essential to a proper determinitiOnof· the ques-
'*Rep~~te~'s note:, A hearing was granted h;r the Supreme CouiTt 
in the case .of Lais.ne v. State Board on June 17, 1940.,: ~he,opin­
Ion of the Supreme Court is reported in 19 Cal.2d 831 [123 P.2d , 
457]. 
'. 
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. tion of th~ board's official duty in the premises, and that sajd 
, record was competent evidf;lnce in the mandamus proceeding 
of . such matters as were properly admissible·· as evidence Qefore the board. . 
[2] . Notwith~tanding the errol' of the trial court in the 
pres~rit case in granting the motion to ~rike fl,"omtlle record 
~h~. transcript of the oral. evidence taken before ·theboaz:d, 
l~ 1$ cleart~at the ruling did not result iIi. prejudice to the 
rlghts.of. th~ appellan:ts~ Both the petitioner and' the.~ppel­
lants Int:rod:u~e~ e~idence in the ttialcourt independent 
,of the admInIstratIve recOrd,hut conce~g matters ,con~ 
tai~ed !n tIre .stricken :record cif oral' eyiaehCe; anQ each' side ' 
, rested. Its, cas:e o~ s~ch ,~vidence., The" trial court" exp,ressly 
, anhounce.d that ItS ~ondttct oftheh~aring~as a "trial de 
novo," and that its decision would. be: rendered on, the evi. 
:df;lnc,e then before itex~lttS.~ve of the. recbrd Ofol'alevidence 
,be~ore the board, unless ,~here wa.s further evidence to be pre-
fsente~ .. No fl!rther eVidence was presented. Theappellartts 
,.b.ase~e,lr c~aIm ofptejlldice on the. ~ssertio,n that the:pet~­
.tlOner s testunony before· the, board· w8sl1I,ateriill. to the " isshes 
Ilnd "':~s there giveninln0l'e detail than in the trial court, 
l1~dthatthey w,~re .dep:('ive,d of the (lPMrturiity to prO<lll~e 
, WI~tl(l$Se,S ,to t~tifY '. t~ the facts, cogtaiI1e<l in the tratl~cdpt 
of .:t;b.'~ oral. eYlgence. Exa~inatiol:l' of the, record disc!o$Els 
·th~t. th~ ,tri~ ~ourt ~Vited tlte introductiC)I1 of. anYe~den.ce 
,as In,an UIil~ted tr1l11 de novo. Th'Q,t evidenc~ wa;s presented 
and as sOl'ecel;ve~supPOrtsthefuidings an!! jUdgfnent~ The 
tact ,thll.t,. ~e testI~Q~~ .. o~ bep.a~f. of. t~e pet,itio.~,~rmay:have 
, ~een more 1Jl d.etall,on th~ ,admlDlstl'a tiye heai'ing wotad not 
'~om:pel 0; JttS~~ _ the ,con<ll~ion . that !fe ~vid¢nce actually 
,rccerve~ :u;t court was lDsUffiment as such support. 
,The Judgment is affirmed. 
Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Griffin, J. pro tem., ~o~curred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-'-I dissent. 
, In this Case the majority opinion gives no heed to the statu-
tory pr~'\Tisions for judi~i~ review. Sections 7090-7098 of 
the BUfjIness and Professions 'Code authorize the Registrar 
of ~ontractors _ to suspeng.· the license of a contractor for 
speCIfied misconduct, . after ,notice and a hearing of "all rele-
':a.Dt and competent evid<"nce material to the issues." Sec-
tion 7099 provides. that any~ecision of the Registrar "shall 
Apr., 1943] RUSSELL v. MILLER 
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be 'subject to review by the s.uperior c6urt" forwliieJi' the 
party ~ay "file pis petition," but is silent,:as to thes,c9pe .Qf 
such .review. It' is riot identified as c~rtior8.ri,· mandamus" 
ortttlY otherstaridardprocedure set .forth' inth~· Ogd~ ~of 
CivitProce'dure.Had the petitioner followed the'statUtory " 
language be would have fi1ed a petitionforteyJ.ew,iri ,thO 
superior,cpurt. It would nbt beunreasQD.able to ·infei: :tliat 
the Legislature intepded a complete retrial in tM;~p¢()r 
court; the reference in section 7101 to '! II; judgment' of iSU~., 
'pension, 01' cancellation of, license b1 tM S11P~rio~ :<@tii"t ':"S~~. 
to impl~ an independentjudgr;nent. Hadcettiol'a.n~e'riew 
been lntended, one wouid look fora diffel'ent.::"tennib01ogy, 
suc,h as" !letting aside or affirnrlng" the ~de,cis:totl)f.· th~:)~egis~. 
tl,"ar. ''nUs court, ,however,lllightlfave followed, the' T~~/ls 
case;$" ,relied upon in the majority oplnio1).in',z)arILv.B~~t'4 
of Medical Examiners, ante, p.790 [136P.2d,304];':and 
arrived at the conclusion that theLegislatu~~did pot ~ean: 
trial de novo. There should at least hav~.beell" an' inqu~ry, .. 
Into the scope of the review int~nded by the;~¢.Sla.~!r' " 
If the majority opinion exemplifies th~. newmtexn ,of trial 
den,ovo in mandamus proceedings it is ,at the.oPPPI3ite'·pole 
from Dare v~ Board of Medical Ej;aminers.Noto,nlywalilthe 
tr'8nscript 6f oral evidence befo:re the boardst!'#cl(,f:totri tlio 
record, but 'the evidence before the boa,rd .waS~¢,it~ra~¢diIi 
the trial court, contrary to the principles in .the .maJ(1rity 
opin$on in the Dare case and without'regfl.rg for th~~~,s 
set forth in that opinion regarding the adn;ti~iQli of new 
eVidence. There is no clue as to whatwou).d 'co~itute an 
abuse of discretion. So much latitude has been given the 
trial, court as to suggest that the' problem whether a pcti-
tioner should be accorded a trial de novo or a review'with the 
Scope of a certiorari review is in effect shifted to the superior 
courts. 
Gibson, C. J., and Edmon~, J." concurred. ' 
